






	 Many	 philosophers	 accept	 that	 prudential	 value	 is	 a	 distinct	 type	 of	 value,	
different	both	from	moral	value	and	also	from	general	non-moral	goodness.1	Those	
who	(like	myself)	accept	 the	category	of	prudential	value	think	of	 it	as	 the	type	of	




are	many	 interesting	and	 (relatively)	underexplored	 foundational	questions	about	
prudential	 value.	 This	 paper	 is	 concerned	 with	 whether	 or	 not	 some	 form	 of	
existence	 internalism	(defined	below)	holds	 for	prudential	value,	and	 if	 so	what	 it	
amounts	to.2		
	 	Existence	 internalism	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 connection	
between	something’s	having	a	certain	positive	normative	status	(its	being	right	or	
its	 being	 intrinsically	 prudentially	 good)	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 elicit	 positive	
psychological	 responses	 from	 human	 subjects.3	Existence	 internalism	 is	 typically	
contrasted	 with	 judgment	 internalism,	 which	 is	 a	 claim	 about	 what	 follows,	 as	 a	




skeptical	 of	 the	 very	 idea	of	 prudential	 value	 that	 is	 relative	 to	 individuals.	However,	 they	 are	not	
skeptical	of	the	idea	of	general,	non-relational	non-moral	goodness.	Others	who	discuss	general,	non-
relational	 goodness	 take	 the	 notion	 of	 intrinsic	 goodness	 to	 be	 primarily	 a	 moral	 notion	
(Zimmerman,	2015).	
2	The	 idea	 that	some	 form	of	 internalism	must	hold	 for	prudential	welfare	 is	 commonly	expressed,	
but	 there	are	 relatively	 few	explicit	discussions	of	what	 such	a	 constraint	might	 amount	 to.	At	 the	
time	 this	 essay	 was	 written	 in	 2014,	 the	 main	 discussions	 of	 prudential	 internalism	 were	 Rosati	
(1996),	Velleman	(2000),	Rosati	(1996),	and	Sarch	(2011).	Since	then	there	have	been	several	new	
additions	to	the	literature.	See	in	particular	Dorsey	(2017)	and	Heathwood	(ms.).		
3	The	 term	 ‘existence	 internalism’	 and	 its	 close	 relative	 ‘judgment	 internalism’	 come	 from	Darwall	
(1983:	54).		A	similar	distinction	with	different	labels	occurs	in	Brink	(1989:	40).		






	 Put	 another	 way,	 it	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 facts	 about	 human	 psychological	
responsiveness	constrain	 the	metaphysics	of	value	 in	particular	ways.	Attempts	 to	
specify	 existence	 internalism	 for	 a	 particular	 domain	of	 value	 are	 attempts	 to	 say	
what	 the	 metaphysical	 constraints	 are	 for	 that	 type	 of	 value.	 Peter	 Railton	
characterizes	 the	 task	 in	 terms	 of	 avoiding	 “alienness.”	 He	 writes,	 “What	 is	
intrinsicially	valuable	for	a	person	must	have	a	connection	with	what	he	would	find	
to	 some	 degree	 compelling	 or	 attractive,	 at	 least	 if	 he	 were	 rational	 or	 aware.	 It	




	 Moral	 existence	 internalism	 is	 typically	 formulated	 as	 a	 claim	 about	
motivation.	This	reveals	an	important	sense	in	which	discussions	of	prudential	value	
differ	 significantly	 from	 discussions	 of	 moral	 value.	 In	 the	 moral	 case,	 we	 are	
typically	 invited	 to	 imagine	 an	 agent	 who	 has	 the	 opportunity	 to	 act	 rightly	 or	
wrongly.	The	question	is	whether	the	moral	facts	are	such	that	her	mere	awareness	
of	 them	would	 give	 her	 (at	 least	 some,	 perhaps	 defeasible)	 motivation	 to	 do	 the	
right	 thing.	 But	 this	 scenario	 is	 prospective.	 Talk	 of	 motivation	makes	 sense	 only	
when	 action	 is	 required,	 and	 action	 is	 only	 sometimes	 required	 in	 relation	 to	
prudential	value.	Sometimes	we	are	in	pursuit	of	the	good.	But	at	other	times	we	talk	
about	 goodness	 that	 is	 realized,	 and	 here	 talk	 of	 motivation	 seems	 out	 of	 place.	
When	 we	 talk	 about	 goods	 that	 a	 person	 ‘has’	 or	 ‘possesses’	 we	 need	 different	
language.	 Rather	 than	 speak	 of	motivation	we	 speak	 of	 caring	 about	 the	 good	 or	
appreciating	the	good	or	some	other	contemporaneous	positive	response.	
	 Several	 theorists	 have	 recognized	 that	 when	we	 theorize	 about	 prudential	
value	we	need	a	broader	psychological	notion	 than	 just	motivation.6	However,	 this	
issue	 of	 terminology	 points	 to	 something	 with	 more	 than	 merely	 terminological	


















of	 well-being	 accept	 internalism,	 I	 aim	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 coherence	 and	
plausibility	 of	 a	particular	way	of	 formulating	 existence	 internalism	 for	 prudential	
value.	 In	 Section	5.3,	 I	 examine	 the	most	 influential	 alternative	 formulation	of	 the	




	 Ordinary	 talk	 about	what	 is	 or	would	 be	 good	 for	 a	 person	 is	 usually	 talk	
about	 prudential	 goods.	 We	 seek	 to	 realize	 various	 kinds	 of	 intrinsic	 prudential	













based	only	on	 its	 intrinsic	properties	 (the	contrast	 is	extrinsic	value),	or	 it	 can	refer	 to	 the	kind	of	
value	something	has	when	we	value	it	for	itself,	as	a	final	end	(the	contrast	being	instrumental	value).	











am	 riding.	 Some	 goods	 are	 temporally	 brief;	 others	 last	 most	 of	 a	 lifetime.	 It	 is	
important	 to	 mark	 a	 distinction	 between	 goods	 that	 are	 currently	 realized	 for	 a	
person	 (currently	 adding	 value	 to	 her	 life)	 and	 goods	 that	 could	 be	 realized	
(depending	 on	 how	 things	 go).	 We	 must	 constantly	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 modal	
distinction	between	realized	good	and	possible	good.		
	 Because	I	maintain	that	prudential	goods	are	the	building	blocks	of	life	value,	















11	A	 certain	 sub-set	 of	 theorists	 reject	 additive	 views	because	 they	 take	 seriously	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
shape	of	a	life	matters	prudentially.	They	tend	to	assume	that	this	rules	out	additivity	(or	as	some	say	
“intra-life	 aggregation”).	 See	 e.g.	 Slote	 (1984),	 Velleman	 (1991),	 Temkin	 (2012),	 Glasgow	 (2013).	
Dorsey	(2015)	demonstrates	that,	depending	on	why	you	think	shape	matters,	taking	shape	seriously	
may	 be	 compatible	 with	 aggregation.	 	 I	 am	 more	 willing	 than	 many	 to	 simply	 downplay	 the	
importance	of	shape	of	life	considerations.	On	this	see	Hawkins	(2014).	
12	I	 find	it	 intuitive	to	distinguish	(as	I	do	in	the	text)	between	a	minimal	sense	of	good	and	a	more	











life.	What	 counts	as	 the	best	 continuation	depends	on	what	 the	 set	of	possibilities	
are.	 The	 best	 continuation	 is	 the	 one	 with	 the	 greatest	 net	 value.	 However,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 remember	 that	 the	 best	 continuation	 of	 a	 life	 (which	 means	 ‘best’	
relative	to	 the	options)	may	not	be	good	 in	either	of	 the	senses	sketched	above:	 it	
may	not	have	positive	net	value,	and	it	may	not	be	good	in	the	aspirational	sense	of	a	
life	“better	than	most.”		
	 The	best	 choice	 for	an	 individual	at	a	 time	 is	 the	one	 that	moves	her	 in	 the	
direction	 of	 realizing	 the	 best	 continuation	 of	 her	 life.	 A	 good	 choice	 is	 one	 that	
moves	 her	 towards	 one	 of	 the	 better	 continuations	 in	 the	 set	 of	 possible	
continuations.	 In	 ordinary	 speech,	 evaluations	 of	 choices	 and	 outcomes	 often	 get	
blurred.	For	example,	we	are	often	reluctant	to	call	a	choice	good	if	the	outcome	it	
produces	 is	not	(even	though	 it	 leads	to	 the	 least	worst	outcome).	And	sometimes	
we	 call	 a	 choice	 good	 if	 it	 helps	 us	 to	 realize	 something	 good	 immediately,	 even	
though	 the	 further	 consequences	 of	 the	 choice	 are	 not	 good.	 In	 what	 follows,	
however,	I	stick	to	the	use	of	“good	choice”	defined	here.		
	 Sometimes	 realizing	 a	 good	 continuation	 of	 a	 life	 requires	 the	 subject	 to	
make	dramatic	changes—changes	of	direction	or	goal.	It	may	require	new	skills	or	
training.	It	may	even	require	changing	aspects	of	herself.	This	is	important,	because	
goodness	 facts	 that	 lie	on	 the	other	 side	of	 great	 change	are	 the	hardest	 for	us	 to	











	 Let	 us	 now	 consider	 potential	 internalist	 constraints	 on	 goodness	 facts.	
Recall	 that	 existence	 internalism	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 connection	
between,	on	the	one	hand,	normative	facts	(in	this	case	prudential	facts)	and	on	the	
other	hand,	human	psychological	responses.	What	might	this	connection	be?		





	 What	 I	 call	 the	 simple	 suggestion	 is	 best	 brought	 out	 through	 examples.13	








consider	 whether	 it	 makes	 her	 happy.	 After	 all,	 people	 can	 sometimes	 be	 made	
happy	by	activities	or	projects	that	they	would	not	exactly	describe	as	pleasurable.	
But	 the	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 Samia	 is	 not	 happy.	 Writing	 leaves	 her	 feeling	
depressed	and	drained.	Sometimes	people	pursue	things	they	value	even	though	the	
pursuit	 doesn’t	 fit	 their	 affective	 profile	 very	well.	 In	 such	 cases,	 despite	 how	 the	
pursuit	 makes	 them	 feel,	 they	 think	 the	 thing	 they	 are	 pursuing	 has	 value.	 It	 is	



















Here,	 I	 intend	positive	 response	 to	be	 construed	quite	broadly	 to	 include	positive	
sensations,	 feelings,	 affective	 states,	 and	 positive	 evaluative	 attitudes.15	However,	
positive	 responses	 must	 be	 psychological	 and	 at	 least	 partly	 conscious.	 It	 is	 also	
important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 condition	 is	 framed	 as	 necessary,	 but	 it	 says	 nothing	
about	the	sufficiency	conditions	for	good.			
	 One	problem	with	SC	emerges	quickly.	It	has	to	do	with	our	understanding	of	
‘response’	and	whether	 it	 is	 flexible	enough	to	cover	cases	of	 temporally	extended	
value	and	the	attitudes	that	ground	such	value.	Suppose	(unlike	a	hedonist)	I	think	
that	relationships	can	have	intrinsic	prudential	value.	A	relationship	might	last	for	a	
long	 time	and	have	value	 for	me	during	all	 of	 that	 time.	But	presumably	 I	 am	not	







ask	me	 if	 I	 was	 born	 there	 I	will	 say	 yes.	 But	 I	 hardly	 ever	 think	 about	 this	 fact,	
																																																								
15	My	 intention	 is	 to	 be	 as	 broad	 as	 possible	within	 the	 range	 of	 positively	 valenced	 psychological	






despite	 believing	 it.	 Only	 rarely	 does	 this	 content	 rise	 to	 the	 level	 of	 occurrent	
thought.		
	 Evaluative	attitudes	are	more	complex	than	ordinary	non-evaluative	beliefs.	




absence	 of	 such	 regular,	 positive	 responses	 to	 writing	 that	 raised	 doubts	 about	
Samia.	 It	 is,	 of	 course,	 entirely	 unclear	 how	many	 responses	 are	 required	 or	 how	
often	they	must	occur.	But	 the	details	need	not	concern	us	here	as	 long	as	we	can	
agree	 that	 it	 is	 too	strong	 to	 say	 that	positive	 response	must	be	constant,	 and	 too	
weak	 to	 require	 that	 positive	 response	 only	 occur	 once.	 I	 suggest	 we	 talk	 about	
valuing	 and	 other	 on-going	 positive	 attitudes	 as	 ‘positive	 engagements,’	 in	









seems	 to	 require	 that	 all	 good	 things	 enter	 the	 awareness	 of	 a	 subject.	 Most	
contemporary	theorists	of	welfare	reject	what	James	Griffin	labeled	“the	experience	
requirement,”	 the	 idea	 that	 prudential	 goodness	 (or	 badness)	 must	 enter	 our	
experience	 or	 our	 awareness.16	They	 insist	 that	 intrinsic	 prudential	 value	 can	 be	
realized	 even	 when	 the	 subject	 is	 ignorant	 of	 this.	 The	 most	 straightforward	
























relation	 must	 obtain	 between	 S	 and	 X	 at	 the	 very	 time	 X	 is	 good	 for	 S.	 What	 is	
relinquished	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 relation	must	 involve	 a	 direct	 experience	 of	 the	
good	thing.	The	right	kind	of	psychological	relations	can	obtain	at	a	time	as	long	as	
certain	 psychological	 dispositions	 for	 response	 obtain	 at	 that	 time.17	It	 is	 also	
important	 that	 the	 counterfactual	 element	 here	 is	minimal.	 No	 appeal	 is	made	 to	
how	S	would	 respond	 to	 X	 in	 conditions	 extremely	 different	 from	 the	 ones	 she	 is	
currently	 in.	The	counterfactual	appeals	to	a	situation	exactly	 like	the	real	one	but	
for	one	difference:	S’s	awareness	of	X.	Finally,	such	an	account	can	still	easily	handle	









not	 good	 for	 Samia,	 since	 Samia	 clearly	 is	 aware	 of	 writing	 yet	 has	 no	 positive	
responses	to	it	and	no	ongoing	positive	engagement	with	it.		
	 Some	 theorists	 may	 still	 find	 SC3	 problematic.	 Even	 though	 there	 is	 no	
requirement	 in	SC3	 that	S	actually	 respond	positively	 to	X,	 there	 is	a	 requirement	
that	 S	 have	 certain	 response	dispositions	 toward	 X	 at	 T.	 Some	 theorists	 think	 that	
once	you	give	up	the	experience	requirement	there	is	no	reason	to	place	restrictions	
on	 the	 subject’s	 psychology	 at	 the	 time	 when	 goodness	 is	 realized.18	But	 this	 is	
mistaken.	Without	some	such	requirement	it	is	far	too	easy	to	generate	bizarre	cases	





why	 it	will	 not	 apply	 just	 as	well	 in	 the	 case	where	 the	 subject	 is	 ignorant	 of	 the	
putative	good.		





some	 indirect	 support	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 theorists	 of	 welfare,	 particularly	




	 Consider	 first	 classical	 hedonism	 according	 to	 which	 pleasure	 is	 the	 only	
basic	 intrinsic	 good	 and	 pain	 the	 only	 basic	 intrinsic	 bad.	 One	 natural	 way	 of	
understanding	the	allure	of	hedonism	is	to	note	that	pleasure	is	a	mental	state	that	









when	 feeling	 it	welcome	 it)	 and	 yet	 at	 a	 different,	 higher	 level	 of	my	 psychology,	
adopt	 a	 disapproving	 attitude	 towards	my	 own	 pleasure	 and	 so	 desire	 not	 to	 be	
experiencing	it.		
	 I	 suggest	we	 think	 of	 this	 ‘welcoming’	 response	 as	 an	 involuntary	 affective	
response,	one	that	operates	at	a	different	level	from	more	cognitively	sophisticated	
attitudes.	It	is	this	immediate,	low-level	reaction	to	pleasure—what	I	am	calling	the	
welcoming	 response—that	 seems	 to	 underwrite	 our	 sense	 that	 experiences	 of	
pleasure	 satisfy	 SC3.	Moreover,	 the	welcoming	 response	 is	 something	we	 reliably	
have	whenever	we	experience	pleasure,	and	it	lasts	only	for	as	long	as	the	pleasure	
lasts.	 Thus	 pleasure	 naturally	 and	 easily	 satisfies	 the	 simple	 constraint:	 for	 the	
hedonist,	pleasure	is	good	whenever	S	experiences	it,	and	whenever	S	experiences	
it,	S	has	a	positive	(welcoming)	response	to	it	at	that	time.		
	 Someone	 might	 object	 that	 whether	 or	 not	 pleasure	 satisfies	 the	 simple	
constraint	depends	on	the	nature	of	pleasure.19		There	is	something	to	this.	To	see	
why,	 consider	 two	 views—distinguished	 by	 L.W.	 Sumner—about	 the	 nature	 of	





might	 be	 quite	 diverse,	 but	 what	 makes	 them	 pleasures	 is	 the	 subject’s	 attitude	
towards	them.22	I	find	it	helpful	to	think	of	such	theories	as	bundle	theories,	because	
																																																								
19	Guy	 Fletcher	 raised	 this	 objection	 when	 this	 paper	 was	 presented	 at	 the	 2014	 Metaethics	











on	 such	 views	 pleasure	 is	 a	 bundle	with	 two	 elements:	 a	 sensation	and	 a	 certain	
kind	of	positive	response	to	that	sensation.		











response.	 In	short,	 if	we	accept	 the	simple	constraint,	 then	 in	order	 for	externalist	




has	come	 from	the	 fact	 that	 theorists	 intuitively	wanted	to	capture	something	 like	
the	simple	constraint	and	thought	that	equating	goodness	facts	with	pleasure	was	a	
way	 to	 do	 this.	 Even	 if	 externalist	 theories	 are	 currently	 more	 popular	 with	
philosophers,	 historically	 many	 hedonists	 were	 internalists	 and	 others	 appear	 to	
have	been	confused	or	undecided	about	which	view	to	accept.23	Moreover,	I	suspect	
internalism	about	pleasure	is	the	naïve	view,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	the	one	most	of	
us	 begin	 with.	 But	 then,	 since	 internalism	 about	 pleasure	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	











it	 (whether	 or	 not	 it	 is	 an	 all-things-considered	 good	 is	 a	 different	matter).	 Given	
that	 this	 is	 so,	 an	externalist	 about	pleasure	 could	make	several	moves.	 She	 could	




SC4:	 A	 necessary	 condition	 of	 X’s	 being	 a	 basic,	 intrinsic	 prudential	 good	 for	 a	





sensation	 at	 its	 core—that	 has	 value,	 and	 it	 has	 this	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 fact	 that	we	








	 Although	desire	 theories	 are	different	 from	hedonism,	desire	 theorists	 also	
seem	to	be	concerned	with	something	like	the	simple	constraint.26	The	evidence	for	
																																																								
24	A	 value	 pluralist	 who	 counts	 pleasure	 as	 one	 value	 among	 others	 could	 combine	 SC4	 with	 the	
earlier	SC3	to	get	a	hybrid	principle.		
25	For	recent,	more	sophisticated	internalist	views	of	pleasure	see	Crisp	(2006),	Smuts	(2011).		
26	It	 is	sometimes	said	that	one	of	the	most	 intuitive	features	of	desire	theories	 is	that	they	(better	
than	 other	 theories)	 capture	 the	 internalist	 constraint.	 See	 e.g.	 Arneson	 (1999),	 Noggins	 (1999),	
Brink	(2008),	Dorsey	(2017).	However,	what	is	meant	is	not	that	desire	theories	preserve	something	
like	 the	constraint	 I	defend	here.	Rather	 such	comments	presuppose	an	entirely	different	vision	of	
what	prudential	internalism	amounts	to,	a	vision	I	think	we	should	reject	(see	my	arguments	against	
Rosati	below).	Although	the	features	of	desire	theory	commonly	thought	to	preserve	internalism	are	















shall	(perhaps)	get	 later.	 It	 is	this	 feature	of	desire	that	creates	problems	for	basic	
desire	 theories.	 It	 is	 usually	 assumed	 that	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 a	 desire	 benefits	 a	
person	at	the	time	the	desire	is	satisfied.	However,	a	person	might	desire	X	at	T,	but	
when	her	desire	 is	 satisfied	at	T2	and	 she	 is	 aware	of	 this,	 it	might	be	 that	 she	 is	
disappointed	in	X.	The	problem	isn’t	just	that	she	is	unhappy.	Desire	theorists	pride	
themselves	 on	 being	 able	 to	 accommodate	 the	 fact	 that	 not	 everyone	 cares	 about	
happiness.	Some	individuals	do	quite	well	in	life	despite	having	little	happiness.	The	
issue	 is	not	happiness	per	se,	but	rather	 lack	of	any	kind	of	positive	response	 to	 the	
putative	good.	Not	only	does	 it	not	make	her	happy	or	give	her	pleasure,	but	now	
that	she	‘has’	it	she	sees	no	value	in	it.		




something	 like	 my	 constraint.	 So	 far	 as	 I	 know,	 such	 a	 commitment	 has	 never	 been	 explicitly	
articulated	by	desire	theorists	or	labeled	by	them	as	internalism.	But	that	the	commitment	is	there	at	
all	strikes	me	as	highly	significant	and	telling.		
27	Sumner	 (1996),	 p129.	 Heathwood	 (2006)	 bucks	 this	 trend,	 using	 ‘desire’	 to	 name	 a	 concurrent	
attitude,	a	pro-attitude	towards	something	at	the	time	you	have	it.	He	thereby	becomes	immune	to	






can	 differ	 about	 the	 type	 of	 response	 that	 matters,	 but	 if	 there	 is	 no	 positive	
response	at	all	we	cannot	sustain	the	thought	that	the	thing	really	is	good.		
	 Because	 there	 are	 so	many	ways	 that	 prospective	 desires	 can	 be	 defective	
and	 thus	so	many	ways	 that	 the	satisfaction	of	prospective	desires	can	disappoint	




accept	 that	 the	 counter-examples	 point	 to	 a	 real	 issue.	 This	 reflects	 an	 implicit	
acceptance	of	the	simple	constraint.		
	 In	 response,	 desire	 theorists	 have	moved	 to	 some	 type	 of	 informed	 desire	
theory.	 Some	 of	 these	 views	 are	 like	 the	 simple	 version	 in	 holding	 that	 the	
satisfaction	 of	 informed	 desires	 is	 of	 intrinsic	 value.	 But	 others	 depart	 from	 this	
somewhat.	Although	still	called	desire	 theories,	here	the	 idea	 is	 that	under	certain	
improved	 epistemic	 conditions	 a	 person	 would	 be	 able	 to	 act	 as	 her	 own	 best	
advisor.28	From	 the	better	 vantage	point	 she	would	be	able	 to	 ‘see’	 the	prudential	
goodness	 facts,	 facts	 about	 goods	 but	 also	 facts	 about	 choices	 and	 lives.	 The	
individual’s	 good	 is	 defined	 as	 what	 from	 this	 special	 epistemically	 advantaged	
position	 she	would	want	 for	 her	 actual	 self	 if	 she	were	 to	 contemplate	 her	 actual	
self’s	 position	 as	 someone	 about	 to	 assume	 her	 actual	 self’s	 position. 29 	The	
advantaged	 self	 might	 want	 particular	 intrinsic	 goods	 for	 her	 actual	 self,	 but	 she	
might	also	want	her	actual	self	to	make	certain	choices	that	will	lead	(perhaps	only	
in	the	long-run)	to	intrinsic	goods.		
	 The	 problem	 with	 all	 such	 accounts	 is	 that	 it	 still	 seems	 possible	 that	
someone	might	get	 the	 thing	her	 informed	self	wants	 for	her	and	yet	not	 find	any	
value	in	it.	Alternatively,	she	might	make	the	choice	that	her	informed	self	wants	her	
to	make	and	persevere	in	this	direction,	yet	never	come	to	respond	positively	to	or	
see	 value	 in	 the	 things	 she	 thereby	 acquires.	 In	 the	 simpler	 case	 we	 find	 it	










we	have	 no	 confidence	 that	 continued	pursuit	 of	 a	 particular	 path	will	 eventually	
lead	to	positive	response	of	some	form,	we	find	it	impossible	to	view	the	case	as	one	
where	 an	 individual	 is	 proceeding	 down	 a	 path	 towards	 something	 good	 for	 her.	
Even	 when	 the	 ideal	 epistemic	 conditions	 are	 described	 as	 incorporating	 full	
information	 and	 full	 rationality,	 philosophers	 continue	 to	 have	 doubts	 about	














recognizing	 it	 as	 the	most	 problematic	 part	 of	 the	 view.	 As	 Shelly	 Kagan	 puts	 it,	
“Friends	of	an	objective	account	of	well-being	seem	forced	to	accept	the	unappealing	
claim	 that	 I	 could	 be	 extremely	 well-off,	 provided	 that	 I	 have	 the	 right	 objective	
goods	in	my	life,	even	though	these	things	hold	no	appeal	for	me,	and	I	am,	in	fact,	
utterly	miserable.”31	It	 is	precisely	 the	un-attractiveness	of	 such	a	 claim	 that	 leads	








consider	 a	 modified	 version	 according	 to	 which	 objective	 goods	 can	 improve	 a	
person’s	life	only	if	he	or	she	has	positive	attitudes	towards	them.	On	Kagan’s	view	a	
person	must	enjoy	the	objective	goods.	Of	course	it	is	not	at	all	clear	whether	these	
theorists	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 distinguish	 between	 realized	 good	 and	 merely	
potential	good	and	so	not	clear	whether	they	would	embrace	the	simple	constraint.	
But	the	quote	from	Kagan	certainly	does	seem	to	suggest	the	simple	constraint.	For	





putative	 counter-examples	 to	 SC3.	 These	 challenge	 the	 necessity	 of	 positive	
response	(or	positive	engagement)	in	cases	where	the	subject	clearly	has	knowledge	
or	awareness	of	the	putative	intrinsic	good.			
	 A	 common	 case	 is	 one	where	 a	 person	 is	 in	 the	 process	 of	 acquiring	 some	
new	skill	or	transitioning	into	some	new	set	of	circumstances.	For	example,	consider	







clinical	 depression.	He	 is	 so	depressed	he	does	not	 currently	have	 the	 capacity	 to	
respond	 positively	 to	 anything.	 He	 feels	 no	 pleasure.	 He	 is	 not	 happy.	 He	 values	
nothing.	 His	 family	 is	 loving	 and	 supportive	 and	 is	 trying	 to	 get	 him	 into	 a	 good	
treatment	 program.	 Surely	 (says	 the	 objector)	 it	 is	 good	 for	 him	 to	 go	 into	
treatment?	 Surely	 the	 love	 and	 support	 of	 his	 family	 are	 good	 for	 him	 even	 now,	
while	he	cannot	appreciate	their	efforts?	The	simple	constraint	seems	to	imply	that	






so	may	 never	 actually	 be	 instantiated).	 People	 who	 are	 severely	 depressed	 often	
cannot	 feel	much	pleasure.	And	they	often	value	 far	less	 than	they	did	beforehand.	
But	it	is	not	clear	that	there	really	are	people	who	remain	self-aware	and	yet	have	no	
capacity	to	respond	positively	to	anything	at	all.		
	 Yet	 there	 are	 people	 whose	 capacities	 for	 positive	 response	 are	 severely	
limited.	 So	 the	question	 remains,	what	 is	 good	 for	 them?	The	 answer	depends	on	
thinking	 about	 the	 structure	 of	 good.	 Certain	 kinds	 of	 claims	 involving	 ‘good’	 are	
true	of	this	individual.		
	 If	the	person	is	treatable,	then	there	exist	possible	continuations	of	her	life	in	
which	 she	 could	 realize	 many	 basic,	 intrinsic	 prudential	 goods	 that	 she	 cannot	
realize	now.	Assuming	that	some	of	 these	possible	 life	continuations	are	ones	 that	
contain	net	positive	 intrinsic	value,	 she	has	a	normative	prudential	 reason	now	to	
try	and	bring	about	one	of	 these.	Whether	or	not	 she	 realizes	 it,	 she	has	a	 reason	
now	to	try	and	end	her	depression.	Mostly	likely	she	doesn’t	realize	it.	But	it	is	also	









cannot	 maintain	 positive	 engagement	 with	 those	 who	 love	 her,	 it	 seems	 that	
currently	 the	 love	and	support	 is	quite	 literally	not	benefiting	her.	And	because	of	

























	 We	 need	 several	 clarifications	 before	 we	 can	 answer.	 To	 begin	 with,	 the	
sentence	 “Y	 would	 be	 good	 for	 S”	 is	 ambiguous.	 ‘Y’	 could	 refer	 to	 some	 putative	
intrinsic	good	or	to	a	choice.	Moreover,	it	could	be	true	that	something—perhaps	a	
particular	 relationship—would	 be	 intrinsically	 good	 for	 a	 subject	 S,	 but	 still	 false	
that	she	ought	to	pursue	it.	For	it	might	also	be	true	that	the	relationship	(which	is	a	
good)	 is	 part	 of	 a	 path	 through	 life	 that	 is	 not	 as	 good	 overall.	 Even	 if	 the	
relationship	is	intrinsically	good,	if	it	is	not	part	of	one	of	the	good	continuations	of	
S’s	life,	then	it	 is	not	a	good	choice.	So	if	we	want	to	consider	issues	of	motivation,	







no. 33 		 When	 it	 comes	 to	 merely	 potential	 good,	 we	 should	 be	 motivational	
externalists.	To	see	why,	we	first	need	some	clarity	about	what	 is	at	stake.	We	are	
interested	 in	 existence	 internalism,	 which	 is	 a	metaphysical	 thesis.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	
confuse	 intuitions	 in	 this	 realm	 with	 intuitions	 about	 judgment	 internalism.	
Judgment	 internalism	 holds	 that	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 connection	 between	 sincere	
judgment	 involving	 evaluative	 concepts	 and	motivation.	 For	 all	 I	 know,	 judgment	
internalism	may	be	true	for	prudential	good.	Perhaps	the	notion	of	prudential	good	
is	such	that	if	you	genuinely	believe	Y	is	the	best	choice	for	you,	you	will	necessarily	
have	 some	 motivation	 to	 choose	 Y.	 	 I	 take	 no	 stand	 on	 that.	 But	 notice	 that	 if	
judgment	 internalism	is	true,	people	will	be	motivated	by	anything	they	believe	to	
be	good,	whether	or	not	it	really	is	good.		
	 Existence	 internalism,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 relation	




about.	 Because	 of	 this	 some	 theorists	 have	 hoped	 to	 secure	 the	 right	 kind	 of	
internalist	 connection	 by	 equating	 prudential	 value	 facts	 with	 facts	 about	 what	
would	make	someone	happy.	Indeed,	the	constraint	would	work	if	we	could	be	sure	
that	 everyone	 is	 always,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 degree,	 motivated	 by	 facts	 about	 what	
would	 make	 them	 happy.	 But	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case.	 Nor	 am	 I	 aware	 of	 any	 other	
candidate	 set	 of	 goodness	 facts	 that	 people	 are	 reliably	 motivated	 to	 pursue,	
independently	of	their	evaluative	beliefs	about	prudential	good.		





33	Many	 theorists	 incline	 towards	 ‘yes.’	 Rosati	 (1996)	 defends	 an	 indirect	 form	 of	 motivational	
internalism.	Tiberius	and	Hall	 (2016)	assume	 the	 truth	of	motivational	 internalism,	and	argue	 that	
one	 point	 in	 favor	 of	 subject-dependent	 theories	 is	 that	 they	 are	well	 placed	 to	 explain	 this	 truth.	






whether	 we	 can	 identify	 any	 plausible	 potential	 goodness	 facts	 that	 we	 can	 be	
certain	she	will	motivated	by.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	we	can.		
	 If	 I	am	right,	 then	we	should	be	motivational	externalists	when	 it	 comes	 to	
unrealized,	merely	potential	good.	Of	course,	even	externalists	can	allow	that	people	
are	 sometimes	motivated	 by	 such	 facts.	What	 they	 deny	 is	 that	 such	motivational	
connections	 are	 necessary.	 And	 that	 seems	 right,	 particularly	 once	 we	 get	 clear	
about	 the	 structure	 of	 good.	Recall	 that	 sometimes	 it	 can	be	 good	 for	 a	 person	 to	
change	her	circumstances	or	herself	dramatically.	It	is	highly	plausible	that,	at	least	
once	 in	a	while,	 the	best	path	forward	through	life	 for	an	 individual	will	be	one	of	
the	paths	that	requires	dramatic	self	change.	But	then	our	theory	will	say	dramatic	
change	 is	 the	 best	 choice.	 And	 in	 these	 kinds	 of	 cases,	 even	 if	 we	 have	 great	







that	 pretty	 successfully	 minimizes	 pleasure.	 But	 Maud	 is	 certainly	 capable	 of	
experiencing	 pleasure	 and	 sometimes	 despite	 herself	 she	 experiences	 some.	
According	 to	 hedonism	 the	 best	 path	 forward	 for	 Maud	 is	 one	 that	 leads	 her	 to	
experience	a	great	deal	of	pleasure.	However,	Maud	is	unlikely	to	embark	on	such	a	
path	without	a	dramatic	change	in	her	outlook,	since	her	current	attitudes	lead	her	
to	 avoid	 pleasurable	 things	 and	 also	 serve	 to	 dampen	 her	 experience	 of	 the	 few	
pleasures	she	unwittingly	stumbles	upon.	Not	only	 is	 the	best	 life	 for	Maud	one	 in	
which	 she	 has	more	 pleasure,	 the	 best	 life	 is	 one	 in	which	 she	 changes	 herself	 in	








abandon	 religion.	 But	 she	 needs	 a	 religious	 view	 that	 (unlike	 her	 current	 one)	
encourages	pleasure.	The	internalist	question	is	whether	we	can	expect	Maud	to	be	
motivated	now	by	knowledge	of	the	descriptive	facts	about	how	much	pleasure	she	
could	 experience	 if	 only	 she	 changed	 her	 beliefs.	 Is	 it	 likely	 that	 she	 would	 be	
motivated	to	make	such	a	choice?	Absolutely	not!	From	her	current	position	she	has	
zero	motivation	to	change.		





	 Consider	 Miserable	 Martha.	 Martha	 is	 not	 always	 miserable,	 but	 she	 does	
suffer	from	regular	bouts	of	serious	uni-polar	depression,	and	when	in	the	grips	of	
these	 spells	 she	 is	miserable.	When	 she	 is	 not	 depressed	 she	 is	 quite	 artistic.	 She	
strongly	suspects	that	part	of	what	contributes	to	the	quality	of	her	art	is	something	
she	gains	from	her	depressive	spells.	Suppose	she	is	right.	And	suppose	she	has	the	
following	 option:	 she	 could	 take	 a	 medication	 that	 would	 relieve	 her	 of	 her	
depressions,	but	it	would	also	alter	slightly	her	personality.	She	would	be	capable	of	
living	a	wonderful	life	as	the	person	she	would	become,	but	she	would	not	be	nearly	
as	 creative	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 her	 artwork	would	 be	 significantly	 less.	 She	 could,	
however,	 have	 healthy	 relationships	 that	 are	 currently	 impossible	 given	 her	




	 Suppose	 the	 best	 possible	 continuation	 of	 Martha’s	 life—the	 one	 with	 the	
greatest	 net	 positive	 intrinsic	 prudential	 value—is	 one	 of	 the	 lives	 she	 could	 lead	
only	with	the	medication.	This	means	she	has	most	reason	right	now	to	give	up	her	
artistic	pursuits,	take	the	medication,	and	embark	on	a	highly	different	path	through	









motivate	 her	 at	 all,	 particularly	 if	 from	 her	 current	 position	 she	 can’t	 personally	
identify	with	the	individual	she	would	become	if	she	pursued	that	path.		
	 I	don’t	think	this	is	a	problem.	We	shouldn’t	really	expect	her	to	be	motivated	
by	 facts	 about	 her	 potential	 good	 that	 are	 so	 removed	 from	 her	 current	
circumstances.	 The	 prudential	 goodness	 facts	 sometimes	 point	 in	 directions	 that,	
from	our	limited,	current	perspectives,	seem	odd.	It	may	just	be	that	the	complexity	
of	future	prudential	value	ensures	that	we	cannot	always	care	about	our	future	good	




	 Before	 we	 settle	 for	 SC3,	 we	 should	 examine	 carefully	 the	 view	 of	 Connie	
Rosati,	 labeled	 “two-tier	 internalism.”35	To-date	 this	 is	 the	 most	 well-developed	
alternative	to	my	view.	
	 To	grasp	two-tier	internalism	we	need	a	couple	of	definitions.	First,	we	need	
the	 notion	 of	 “ordinary	 optimal	 conditions.”	 These	 are	 just	 the	 conditions	 of	















are	 hampered	 by	 various	 limitations.	We	 lack	 knowledge.	We	 are	 prone	 to	many	
forms	of	irrationality.	Thus,	it	is	natural	to	suppose	that	if	we	had	full	knowledge,	or	
could	 be	 always	 rational	 our	 judgments	would	 presumably	 be	much	 better.	 If	we	
push	 such	 ideas	 to	 the	 limit	 we	 arrive	 at	 the	 notion	 of	 ideally	 authoritative	
conditions—the	set	of	epistemic	conditions	that	are	ideally	authoritative	for	making	
judgments	about	prudential	value.37	I	shall	refer	to	these	conditions	as	C*.		
	 We	 can	 now	 explain	 two-tier	 internalism	 as	 follows.	 Consider	 a	 case	 of	
potential	good	(as	we	shall	see	it	works	the	same	way	for	realized	good).	Facts	about	
potential	 good	 can	 typically	 be	 translated	 into	 claims	 about	 good	 choices	 in	 the	
present.	So,	suppose	it	is	true	that	Y	is	the	best	choice	for	S	now.		
	 Speaking	 roughly,	 two-tier	 internalism	 requires	 first	 that	 S	 herself	 under	
ideally	authoritative	conditions	recognize	this	fact	about	her	good	(that	Y	is	the	best	
choice).	 For	 various	 reasons	 the	 actual	 requirement	 needs	 to	 be	 formulated	 in	 a	
slightly	 more	 complicated	 way	 as	 follows:	 It	 must	 be	 true	 that	 in	 C*	 if	 S	
contemplates	the	situation	of	her	actual	self	as	someone	about	to	assume	the	actual	
self’s	position,	she	would	want	her	actual	self	to	choose	Y.38		
	 The	 second	 requirement	 of	 two-tier	 internalism	 is	 that	 under	 ordinary	
optimal	conditions	a	person,	S,	cares	about	what	she	would	want	in	C*.	This	means	
that	even	 if	 in	ordinary	circumstances	 she	can’t	 recognize	 facts	about	her	good	as	
facts	about	her	good	(and	so	can’t	be	motivated	by	them),	she	still	cares	at	that	time	
about	what	her	ideal	self	would	want	in	C*.	Of	course,	presently	she	can’t	make	 the	
connection	between	what	 is	 really	good	 for	her	 (Y)	and	what	 the	 ideal	 self	would	
want	 in	 C*.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	 right	 now	 she	 cares	 about	what	 her	 ideal	 self	would	
want	 in	C*	means	that	 if	she	could	make	the	connection—if	she	could	come	to	see	











	 Rosati	 clearly	 intends	 two-tier	 internalism	 to	 serve	as	 a	 constraint	on	both	




	 Rosati	 and	 I	 agree	 that	 there	 is	 an	 internalist	 constraint	 on	 facts	 about	
current	realized	intrinsic	good—that	there	must	be	some	kind	of	psychological	link	
between	a	 subject	and	 facts	about	what	 is	good	 for	her	now.	We	simply	offer	 two	
different	 accounts	 of	 what	 that	 constraint	 is.	 Like	 SC3,	 Rosati’s	 constraint	 is	 best	
understood	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition	 only.	 Although	 two-tier	 internalism	 and	 SC3	
are	naturally	understood	as	competing	accounts	of	a	single	constraint	on	facts	about	





currently	 good	 for	 a	 subject,	 S.	 And	we	would	 then	 need	 to	 establish	 in	 that	 case	




	 First,	 it	seems	to	me	that	no	matter	what	the	status	of	two-tier	 internalism,	
we	 still	 need	 SC3	 in	 the	 case	 of	 realized	 goodness	 facts.	 Suppose,	 for	 example,	 a	
theory	were	to	say	that	writing	is	intrinsically	good	for	Samia	at	the	very	time	when	




fails	 in	 the	 case	 of	 realized	 goodness.	 Two-tier	 internalism	 was	 formulated	 in	
response	 to	 worries	 about	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 subject	 to	 recognize	 and	 positively	













	 Nonetheless,	 one	 might	 think	 that	 we	 need	 something	 like	 the	 two-tier	
requirement	 when	 we	 focus	 on	 facts	 about	 possible	 good.	 It	 is	 unlikely	 that	 any	
theory	of	welfare	will	be	able	to	ensure	that	agents	are	always	reliably	motivated	to	
pursue	what	would	be	best	for	them.	But	one	might	hope	that	two-tier	internalism	
could	 forge	 an	 indirect	 link	 between	 the	 facts	 about	potential	 individual	 good	 and	
the	subject’s	current	motivations.			
	 Consider	again	Miserable	Martha	for	whom	(let	us	assume)	the	best	choice	is	
medication	 and	 self-transformation.	 If	 the	 two-tier	 requirement	 is	 satisfied,	 this	
means	both	(a)	 that	 in	C*	Martha	would	want	her	actual	self	 to	adopt	 the	 life	 that	
medication	makes	possible,	and	(b)	right	now	(assuming	she	is	not	currently	in	the	
grips	of	depression)	Martha	cares	about	what	her	 ideal	self	would	want	 in	C*.	The	
question	 is	whether	 the	best	 theory	of	welfare	 can	 ensure	both	 that	Martha	 in	C*	
wants	 the	 right	 things	and	 that	 actual	Martha	 cares	about	 the	desires	of	her	 ideal	












faith	 that	 the	 pronouncements	 of	 such	 an	 idealized	 self	 would	 really	 track	 the	
goodness	facts.	I	am	not	sure	we	should	trust	the	pronouncements	of	such	a	self.	Nor	
do	I	think	there	is	some	way	to	amend	the	description	of	ideal	conditions	to	fix	the	
problem.	 This	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 my	 skepticism	 about	 full	 information	 theories	 of	
prudential	 good.	 But	 it	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 to	 accept	 two-tier	
internalism,	 for	 although	 it	 is	 not	 a	 theory	 of	 prudential	 value,	 it	 is	 a	 proposed	
constraint	on	such	theories.	If	there	is	no	C*	such	that	the	pronouncements	from	C*	











	 Suppose	 for	 the	 sake	of	 argument	 that	 there	 is	 some	 set	 of	 ideal	 epistemic	
conditions	C*	such	that	an	agent	 in	these	conditions	reliably	 judges	her	own	good.	
Still,	 actual	agents	do	not	all	agree	about	what	 these	conditions	are.	Probably	 it	 is	
true	for	the	vast	majority	of	people	that	there	is	some	description	or	other	of	better	
epistemic	conditions	 they	would	accept	as	authoritative.	Let	us	call	 the	conditions	
accepted	 by	Martha	 C+Martha,	 and	 the	 ones	 accepted	 by	Maud	 C+Maud.,	 and	 for	 each	
person	 the	 conditions	 she	 would	 view	 as	 authoritative	 are	 C+hername.	 	 In	 ordinary	
optimal	 conditions	Martha	 cares	what	 she	would	want	 in	 C+Martha	 and	Maud	 cares	
what	 she	would	want	 in	 C+Maud.	 But	 unless	 C+Martha	 is	 the	 same	 as	 C*	 this	will	 not	
forge	 a	 motivational	 link	 with	 the	 true	 goodness	 facts.	 In	 short,	 if	 people	 do	 not	
generally	agree	about	ideally	authoritative	conditions,	then	even	if	there	is	a	C*	that	





	 It	 is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	many	people,	 even	when	 they	 are	 free	of	
violent	emotion,	are	not	delusional,	and	so	on,	are	willing	to	grant	authority	to	less	
than	 ideal	 judgments—judgments	 made	 without	 full	 information	 or	 that	 are	
irrational	in	one	or	another	sense.	Nor	can	they	all	easily	be	brought	to	see	the	error	
of	 their	epistemic	ways.	Even	 if	very	many	people	can,	we	have	 to	remember	 that	





	 Accepting	 motivational	 externalism	 about	 potential	 good	 might	 be	 more	
distressing	if	we	were	also	externalists	about	realized	good.	To	embrace	a	dual	form	
of	externalism	would	be	to	accept	that	the	psychology	of	individual	subjects	places	
no	 necessary	 constraint	 on	 prudential	 goodness	 facts.	 That	 does	 seem	 deeply	
problematic.	 Since	most	 theorists	 until	 now	 have	 not	 distinguished	 realized	 good	
and	 potential	 good	 and	 so	 have	 not	 considered	whether	 the	 constraints	 for	 each	
might	be	different,	 it	 is	easy	to	see	why	a	claim	like	two-tier	 internalism	would	be	





	 We	have	 covered	a	 lot	 of	 ground.	 I	 first	 reviewed	my	understanding	of	 the	
“structure	 of	 good,”	 emphasizing	 a	 modal	 distinction	 between	 realized	 intrinsic	
prudential	goods	and	merely	potential	good.		
	 Against	 this	 backdrop	 I	 argued	 that	 we	 should	 understand	 existence	























attempt	 to	 forge	 an	 indirect	 link	 between	 prudential	 goodness	 facts	 and	 an	
individual’s	motivations.	SC3	is	superior	to	two-tier	 internalism	when	we	focus	on	
facts	about	realized	goodness.	And	in	the	case	of	potential	good	it	is	ultimately	wiser	
to	accept	that	no	internalist	constraint,	even	an	indirect	one,	can	be	had.		
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